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29 December 1965

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25X1

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


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

25X1



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29 December 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

25X1

2. USSR: Shelepin's trip to Hanoi indicates Soviet bid to make influence felt. (Page 3)

[REDACTED]

25X1

5. Notes: Indonesia; Zambia-Rhodesia; France - West Germany. (Page 7)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008700100001-4

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008700100001-4

*USSR - North Vietnam - Communist China:
Moscow's decision to send one of its top leaders-- party secretary Shelepin--to Hanoi indicates a clear intention to make its influence felt with the North Vietnamese, especially at this time.

According to a 28 December TASS announcement, Shelepin will head a Soviet delegation which is to leave for the DRV "shortly." His visit will mark the first trip to Hanoi by a high-level Soviet leader since the Kosygin mission last February.

The Soviets probably feel that the current pause in US bombing raids against North Vietnam provides a good opportunity to encourage Hanoi to seek political alternatives to the war. [They have been advising the North Vietnamese recently that they should encourage the Liberation Front to "facilitate negotiations when that stage is reached."]

The announcement of the Shelepin visit coincides with increased Russian material and political support for the DRV and renewed expressions of Hanoi's gratitude for Moscow's "great assistance." It also comes at a time when the Soviets have displayed particular sensitivity and concern over possible US moves which might lead to an escalation of the war both in North and South Vietnam.

The Shelepin mission in any event represents a direct challenge to China's influence in Hanoi. Nevertheless, he will probably stop over in Peking where perfunctory talks with the Chinese can be expected.

Hanoi, perhaps in an effort to balance Shelepin's visit, has published a lengthy article lauding the "broad and tremendous support" which the Chinese Communists have provided North Vietnam. This article in the authoritative North Vietnamese organ Nhan Dan on 28 December included a statement that

29 Dec 65

3

"several hundred thousand Chinese youths, including a large number of army men, have enlisted as volunteers to fight by the side of the Vietnamese people against the US aggressors."

The language used in the article appears to be stronger than the standard Chinese statements concerning Peking's "willingness" to send volunteers to Vietnam. There is, however, no evidence of a campaign to recruit volunteers in China nor are there any indications of a concentration of "several hundred thousand" Chinese near the Sino-DRV border. Peking has said it was prepared to send volunteers to Vietnam if they were requested, but Chinese propaganda has not stressed this position recently. In fact Chinese propaganda has implied that ^{it is} ~~their~~ intervention is not required under present circumstances.

Nonetheless, the Nhan Dan statement apparently is intended to intimate that a substantial Chinese presence could well appear in Vietnam on short notice if it were requested.

25X1

[* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]

29 Dec 65

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008700100001-4

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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NOTES

Indonesia: No major new developments have been reported. The army is giving [priority attention] *major political emphasis* to preparations for trials of the 30 September coup plotters late next month. The army is also considering a legal maneuver designed to get around Sukarno's continued refusal to ban the PKI. [Military legal experts are reported planning a declaration by the special military tribunal on the "criminal" nature of the Communist party, which would legalize the army's anti-Communist activities.]

25X1

Zambia-Rhodesia: [Britain's POL airlift to Zambia may be stopped for a few days by an unexpected lack of oil drums at the Dar es Salaam loading base. President Kaunda, who already doubts Britain's ability to keep Zambia afloat during the UK program of sanctions against Rhodesia, is likely to see in this temporary snag further proof that London's strategy will not work. Notwithstanding the accord which was reached with the Zambian Foreign Minister in Washington on 27 December, the danger is increasing that Kaunda will feel compelled to take some reckless action against the rebel regime.]

25X1

France - West Germany: Further evidence of the growing friction between France and West Germany was revealed during the mid-December NATO ministerial meeting in Paris. The French opposed insertion of a clause in the final communiqué supporting the Federal Republic against recent Soviet charges of revanchism and nuclear ambitions and were forced to back down only after the other Alliance members closed ranks behind Germany. The incident paralleled the French foreign minister's unsuccessful campaign during the same meeting to set a time limit on the work of the new NATO Special Committee on nuclear planning, in which the Germans are participating.

25X1

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